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the defendant's motion and to his application here is that
good cause appears for continuing the case beyond the 60day period ( 1) by the consent of the defendant to postponement of the trial beyond the 60-day period, and (2) by the
reasonableness of the delay thereafter due to the fact that
the court was engaged in the trial of other cases.
The order to show cause is discharged and the ·petition for
a writ is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
Schauer, J., dissented.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied July
10, 1952. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the application should be granted.

[L. A. No. 19435. In Bank. June 20, 1952.]
THE ROSICRUCIAN FELLOWSHIP (a Corporation) et
al., Appellants, v. THE ROSICRUCIAN FELLOWSHIP NON-SECTARIAN CHURCH (a Corporation)
et al., Respondents.
[1] Religious Societies-Internal A1fairs-Jurisdiction of Courts.

-General rule that courts will not interfere in religious
societies with reference to their ecclesiastical practices is
qualified by rule that civil and property rights will be adjudicated.
[2] !d.-Internal A1fairs-Jurisdiction of Oourts.-In a controversy between religious societies as to use of property and
[1] Determination by civil. courts of property rights between
contending factions of an independent chmch, notes, 8 A.L.R.
105; 70 A.L.R. 75. See, also, Oa.l.Jur., Religious and Charitable
Societies, § 13; Am.Jur., Religious Societies, § 41.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Religious Societies, § 11; [3]
Equity, § 20; [4, 5] Religious Societies, § 13(1); [6] Religious
Societies, § 18; [7] Religious Societies, § 16; [8] Religious Societies, §12; [9] Contracts, §108; [10] Injunctions, §14; [11]
Religious Societies, § 19; [12] Injunctions, § 12; [13] Injunctions,
§ 33; [14] Religious Societies, § 20.
·
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exercise of other rights, it is necessary to ascertain from the
acts, dealings and usages of the parties where the various
rights rest to determine the ownership of civil and property
rights, even though some so-called ecclesiastical functions are
so interwoven with civil and property rights that any decision
involving the latter must necessarily affect the former.
[S] Equity-Disposal of Entire Controversy-Facts at Time of
Trial.-In an action in the nature of an equitable proceeding,
the court may consider the facts as they existed at the time
of trial so that the interests of justice may be subserved.

[4] Religious Societies-Property Rights.-Where the rights involved in a controversy between religious societies are essentially property in nature, some of them may be in one society
and others in another society in accordance with the conduct
and usage of the parties.
[5] !d.-Property Rights.-Where an unincorporated church and
its members from the first exercised property and civil rights
incident to ecclesiastical functions, and a corporation later
formed for the purpose of transferring to it certain property
and some temporal functions of the unincorporated church
association was organized without the consent of the unincorporated association or its members, there has not been
a surrender of all rights to the corporation or an acquiescence
of its exercise of such rights so as to estop the association
from asserting them.
[6] Id.- Evidence.- Where the evidence is conflicting as to
whether a church or a corporation subsequently formed was
to exercise ecclesiastical functions or whether such corporation was first organized as a college or seminary and was to
be only the trustee of certain property or was to exercise
only physical or purely business functions, it is for the trial
court to weigh the evidence and draw any reasonable inferences deducible therefrom.
[7] Id.-Parties.-One or more members of a church may prosecute an action or cross-action for the benefit of all if sufficient
facts are pleaded to make it a proper representative suit; in
such a case all the persons represented are not indispensable
·
·
parties.
[8] Id.-Oontracts.-A contract between woman establishing an
organization for dissemination of certain religious teachings
and an older corporation distributing such teachings for dissolution of the organization formed by her, granting to corporation an irrevocable license to publish all writings covered
by copyrights owned by such woman, providing for her election as trustee of corporation, chairman of its executive com-
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mittee and manager of its activities, and also providing that
she was to become ''President Emeritus" on retiring from
authority, indicates that she was to hold the positions named
until she retired from authority, and is breached by her removal from such positions against her wishes.
[9] Contracts-Consideration-PJ::oof.-Testimony of witness that
she received no consideration for giving up her right to license
the use of certain writings to another may be considered as
showing that she did not receive consideration where no objection was made to such testimony as being a conclusion
drawn by her.
[10] Injunctions-Matters Controllable-Acts Completed.-An injunction is ordered against past acts only if there is evidence
that they will probably recur.

[11] Religious Societies-Injunctive Relief.-Part of injunction
restraining interference by corporation with "dominant use"
of property for ecclesiastical purposes by church followers
is not uncertain where the quoted words clearly mean superior right and the judgment in other parts defines such
rights.
[12] Injunctions-Matters Controllable-Freedom of Speech.-An
injunction will not be granted where the restraint interferes
with freedom of speech.
[13] !d.-Discretion of Oourt.-Injunctive relief is to some extent
discretionary with the court, and denial of such relief will not
warrant a reversal unless such discretion has been abused.
[14] Religious Societies-Appeal-Harmless Error.-Alleged error
in controversy between religious societies in denying plaintiff right to prove by a witness that a list of members exhibited to her contained names of persons who were not members of defendant organization is not prejudicial where rights
were accorded to all followers of religious philosophy involved
regardless of whether they were members of such organization.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. Robert B. Burch, Judge. Modified and affirmed.
Action to enJom use of name, to which defendants :filed
a cross-complaint for declaratory relief. Judgment for defendants modified and affirmed.
[10] See Cal.Jur., Injunction, § 24; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 6.
[13] See Ca.l.Jur., Injunctions, § 10; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 35.
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Rollin L. McNitt, Homer C. Compton and Edythe Jacobs
for Appellants.
Stewart, Shaw & Murphey, Luce, Forward, Kunzel &
Scripps, Fred Kunzel and William L. Murphey for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment that
plaintij! take nothing by its action to obtain, among other
things, an injunction against the use of the name ''The
Rosicrucian Fellowship'' and declaring the rights of the parties in response to defendants' cross-complaint for declaratory relief.
Plaintiff, The Rosicrucian Fellowship, is a corporation
formed in 1913. Cross-defendants are plaintiff and the trustees of that corporation. Defendants and cross-complainants
are a church corporation, formed in 1944, The Rosicrucian
Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church, Mrs. Heindel, and followers of the rosicrucian philosophy. The controversy mainly
concerns whether plaintiff corporation or defendant corporation and the unorganized followers have rights in connection
with certain property acquired in the course of the development of the religious group known as ''The Rosicrucian Fellowship.''
The preliminary background of the religioufi! movement is
not disputed. According to the :findings of the trial court,
Max Heindel, after study in Europe in 1908, wrote a book
called "The Cosmo-Conception of Mystic Christianity" which
he used as a basis .for teaching what he described as the rosicrucian philosophy to organized groups of followers, called
centers, in various cities in the United States. He classified
his followers, with respect to their proficiency in the philosophy, as disciples, probationers and students. In 1910, Heindel
married defendant Mrs. Heindel who thereafter assisted him
in writing, teaching and obtaining followers. The Heindels
and their followers constituted, until July 6, 1944, an unincorporated church association known as ''The Rosicrucian
Fellowship." This association, as distinguished froin plaintiff
corporation, was without an ecclesiastical system of church
government until July 6, 1944, when the defendant corporation was formed.
In 1911, Heindel purchased, with his wife's assistance, taking title in his name, real property in San Diego County
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called by them "Mt. Ecclesia." Improvements were made on
the property by them prior to. Heindel's death and by Mrs.
Heindel thereafter with funds received by them and later by
plaintiff corporation from contributions from followers and
the sale of writings. Heindel indicated by letters to his
followers that he held the property in trust for the use and
benefit of the followers of the philosophy. In 1913, the Heindels formed plaintiff corporation, named ''The Rosicrucian
Fellowship,'' for the purpose of transferring to it the property
known as Mt. Ecclesia and some temporal functions of the
unincorporated church association. The articles of incorporation expressed the purpose "to establish a college or seminary for the study" of the rosicrucian philosophy. Under the
articles and by-laws the followers were not members of the
corporation. It was formed and the amendments to its
articles, later mentioned, were adopted without their approval
or consent, or the approval or consent of the unincorporated
association previously mentioned.
The court found that from 1913 until his death in 1919,
Heindel held title to Mt. Ecclesia, and he and his wife, with
the assistance of their followers, members of the unincorporated church association, conducted all the so-called ecclesiastical functions for the church association, and at all times,
until July 6, 1944, Mrs. Heindel and members of the church
association conducted all such ecclesiastical functions of the
philosophy, which included teaching, preparing and disseminating writings and soliciting members.
Mrs. Heindel, between 1916 and 1919, became the owner of .
all the writings of her husband by assignment and will. (She
is still the owner supject to the 1931 contract later mentioned
herein.) In 1919, after Heindel's death, Mrs. Heindel conveyed Mt. Ecclesia to plaintiff corporation in trust for the
use and benefit of the followers of the philosophy a8 members
of the church association (later plaintifi corporation acquired
a:q. ~dditional 10 acres), and later as members of defendant
corporation.
In 1925, the articles of plaintifi corporation were amended
to include among the purposes the establishment of a nonsectarian church (to teach and dissPminate the rosicrucian
philosophy) and a sanitarium. In 1931, the articles were
again · amended,. declaring the establishment of a college of
le~rning to teach and dissemilfate the philosophy, to be one
of the purposes. A 1935 amendment changed the name to
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The Rosicrucian College.'' In 1940, the articles were
amended to recite that the corporation was formed under the
nonprofit college incorporation law; the name was changed
back to 1 1 The Rosicrucian Fellowship'' and the purpose was
again declared to be for the establishment of a church or
religio~s organization to disseminate the rosicrucian philosophy.
In January, 1943, the members of the church association
organized (287 of them) an association for a church institution, which on July 6, 1944, was incorporated-defendant
corporation-with the declared purpose of organizing and
conducting a church. By-laws and rules were adopted for a
complete system of representative church government.
Dissension developed in the organization in 1931 when Mrs.
Heindel withdrew from The Rosicrucian Fellowship and moved
to Oceanside where she established an organization known as
the Max Heindel Rose Cross Fellowship, which undertook to
carry on activities relating to the advancement of the rosicrucian philosophy. In settlement of the controversy with respect to the use of the writings, a contract was made between
plaintiif corporation and Mrs. Heindel in October, 1931, in
which it was recited that there existed a controversy between
them concerning the legal ownership of the writings, and that
Mrs. Heindel had established an organization for disseminating the teachings theretofore distributed by plaintiif. It was
agreed that plaintiff should have an 1 1 undisputed, irrevocable
license, right and permit'' to publish, sell, etc. all writings;
that, subject to plaintiff's right, Mrs. Heindel was the owner
· for life of the writings, which would vest on her death in
plaintiif. Neither party should authorize others to distribute
the writings without the consent of the other, except that Mrs.
Heindel could give a license to an organzation formed or
sponsored by her j plaintiif was to provide a life annuity for
Mrs. Heindel, paying $125 per month ; if she ceased her activities competitive with plaintiif before January 15, 1934, the
annuity would be increased to $208.33 per month; provision
was made for arbitration; a statement was to be sent to all
followers that the controversy was settled. The court found
that defendant corporation is sponsored and led by Mrs.
Heindel. In October, 1934, another contract was made by
the same parties in which was recited some of the main provisions of the 1931 contract and that Mrs. Heindel had formed
a corporation sole, Max Heindel Rose Cross Philosophies,
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which was distributing the writings and had a following of
2,050; that plaintiff corporation bas continued its activities
since the "schism," having 4,500 followers; that each has
certain assets; that Mrs. Heindel and her corporation and followers have been asked to unite with plaintiff and they have
accepted and the parties have agreed to a consolidation. In
consideration of $1.00 paid by each to the other and other
valuable consideration it was agreed that Mrs. Heindel's
corporation shall be dissolved and its books and equipment
shall be transferred to plaintiff and paid for at a specified
price. The 1931 contract was continued in force except that
Mrs. Heindel did not have the right to grant to any organization the right to use the writings. Mrs. Heindel's annuity
was fixed at $125 per month. As a part of the consideration,
Mrs. Heindel was to have living quarters and sustenance at
Mt. Ecclesia for life; to be elected a trustee of plaintiff and
"elected" chairman of the "executive or governing committee" ; to become the "manager" in charge of activities of
plaintiff under the committee of five, naming three of them;
the lessons and letters to be signed by her on behalf of plaintiff; and she was to be editor of the magazine. It was finally
recited that: ''All the parties hereto are of one mind upon the
proposition that the schism referred to above has caused great
misunderstanding upon the part of many people and has
injured and delayed the progress of the work. It is believed
by all concerned that a repetition of conditions which resulted from this schism is to be avoided in view of the fact
that Max Heindel, as a representative of the Elder Brothers
of the order brought these teachings to the people, and that
Mrs. Heindel spent years of her active life helping to build
up the institution, that a part of the consideration of this
contract should be assurance to her that if at any time she
ceases to be active in connection with the work and retires
from authority, that she shall then become President Emeritus
of the organization for life, and that her annuities, her living
quarters and her sustenance shall continue during her lifetime, and that she will cooperate with the Fellowship to the
end that the teachings of the Rosicrucian Philosophies may be
given to the world to the best possible advantage.'' The court
interpreted the contract to mean that the consideration running to Mrs. Heindel was that she was entitled to be a trustee,
chairman of the governing committee and manager of plaintiff
corporation at all times thereafter until she voluntarily re-
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tired. Th~ corporation performed its promise until February, 1942, when she was removed from the positions against
her wishes. On October 7, 1944, Mrs. Heindel gave notice
of cancellation of the 1934 contract.
The troubles evidently came to a head after Mrs. Heindel
was removed from her positions, for on April 6, 1942, Weaver,
Munson and Grow, as members of the unincorporated church,
commenced an action in the Superior Court of San Diego
County. The action was against plaintiff corporation and
the trustees thereof, and it was there found that they sued
on behalf of _500 members of the church. Plaintiffs there
sought a declaration that they and the other members had
a right to participate in the election of trustees of plaintiff
corporation and to recover $41,939.56, alleged to have been
misapplied by the trustees in the operation of the sanitarium
at Mt. Ecclesia during the period from 1939 to 1942. The
judgment in that action declared that plaintiff corporation
was existing and that its articles were legally amended in
1925, 1930, 1931, 1935 and 1940, and all its by-laws were
legally adopted ; the followers of the rosicrucian philosophy
constitute a church known as ''The Rosicruc1an Fellowship''
as distinguished from plaintiff corporation; that the church
has no ecclesiastical organization or system of church government; that plaintiff corporation owns and holds Mt. Ecclesia
as trustee for the members of the church; that the church members are entitled to an accounting from the corporation for
misapplication of funds; that the followers of the philosophy
and members of the church are not corporate members of the
corporation and are not entitled to vote for the election of
trustees ; that the church. has no spiritual head; and that the
removal of Mrs. Heindel in February, 1942, as president of
plaintiff corporation was legal•
Based upon the :findings the court in the case at bar rendered judgment declaring that all of Mt. Ecclesia and all
personal property thereon was owned by plaintiff corporation
but that the· church association and defendant corporation
and followers were entitled to the dominant use of the property for so-called religious purposes without interference
inasmuch as :plaintiff corporation held it only as a trustee
and they were beneficiaries. It was also declared that such
beneficiaries had the dominant right to enjoy and use such
•That action was entitled Wea11er v. Meync'ke and the judgment became 1!nai in the superior court.
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property for such functions which include ''lecturing, teaching of the Rosicrucian Philosophy to people interested therein;
the establishment of centers for the study and teaching of
Mystic Christianity as interpreted and expounded by Mr.
and Mrs. Max Heindel in all books, pamphlets and letters
written by them, or either of them; issuing and revoking
charters of any and all centers; the preparation of correspondence courses for the study, teaching and dissemination
of the Rosicrucian Philosophy; the preparation of all ecclesiastical and esoteric lessons and letters to Students, Probationers and Disciples; the preparation of horoscopes and
astrodiagnosis thereof for the assistance and guidance of Students, Probationers and Disciples in alleviating mental and
physical suifering, difficulties and problems; the recommendation of diets for the physical welfare of Students, Probationers
and Disciples requesting the same; corresponding with Students, Probationers and Disciples in the United States and
elsewhere regarding the said religious belief, and the teaching
and dissemination thereof; to suspend and expel Students,
Probationers and Disciples according to its by-laws, rl;lles and
regulations'' ; that plaintiff corporation has not acquired the
right and may not use the property to perform any of those
functions, and the church association and said · beneficiaries
have not lost any of such rights by waiver or estoppel; that
plaintiff corporation may use the property in the conduct of
the temporal functions including "the printing, publishing,
selling of said books, pamphlets and letters written by Mr. and
Mrs. Max Heindel from and after October 23, 1931; the printing or multigraphing and mailing of ecclesiastical and esoteric
letters and lessons written by Mrs. Max Heindel or other Probationers or Disciples designated by the Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church; the possession and use of a mailing list of Students, Probationers and Disciples and addressograph plates and machinery for the transposition thereof, for
mailing purposes only ; the operation of a lodge and a cafeteria; the receipt and recording of Students' monthly report
cards and Probationers' monthly reports; the employment
and discharge of empioyees for said purposes; the receipt of
gifts and contributions specifically designated for said corporation; the collection of monies from its sale of said books,
pamphlets and letters and from the operation of said lodge
and cafeteria; the payment of salaries and taxes; the manage39 C.2d-5
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ment and maintenance of said real property fixtures, improvements and personal property thereon; all for the account and
benefit of the Probationers and Disciples, as members of the
said unincorporated church association and as members of
The Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church, beneficiaries thereof'' ; that Mrs. Heindel is the owner of all the
copyrights on all the writings ; that the church association
and defendant corporation and members may use the name
"The Rosicrucian Fellowship"; that the members of the
defendant corporation and followers of the philosophy own
the list of names and addresses of all followers; that the 1934
contract above referred to was breached by plaintiff corporation and is "null and void" but the corporation has the
nonexclusive right under the 1931 contract to publish and
sell the writings; that defendant corporation has a nonexclusive right under a license agreement of 1944 from Mrs.
Heindel to publish and sell such writings. Injunctive relief
was granted against plaintiff corporation wherein it was restrained from doing various things later mentioned herein.
From the judgment it is clear that the main object was to preserve the use of the property to the followers of the philosophy, and as later seen, not to interfere with them in the exercise of their .ecclesiastical functions.
The main contention of plaintiff corporation on this appeal
is that the court had no jurisdiction to decide who was entitled
to exercise the ecclesiastical functions pertaining to the rosicrucian philosophy ; that first the unincorporated church association and later the defendant corporation and members had
such power.
.
The provisions of the judgment and discussions during the
trial, taking them as a whole, though in part couched in
language dealing with ecclesiastical functions, purport to deal
with civil and property rights, such ·as, who may use the
property at Mt. Ecclesia, lists of members, rights to property, rights in the writings and disposal thereof, solicitation
of members and contributions. It should be observed that various rights affected by the judgment have civil and property
right connotations. Illustrations are: The right to use a
name "The Rosicrucian Fellowship" (see Law v. Crist, 41
Cal.App.2d 862 [107 P.2d 953]); the publication and sale of
copyrighted books and documents and emblems (see Johnston v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal.App.2d 196 [187
P .2d 474;] }; mailing lists (see California Intelligence Bureau
v. Cunningham, 83 Cal.App.2d 197 [188 P.2d 303] ). Hence
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the judgment may well be proper as reaching and affecting
such rights, as it does, although by its language it might seem
to go further and declare who may carry out so-called ecclesiastical functions, which may include the right to use the
property to teach the philosophy and the solicitation of members and contributions.
[1] The general rule that courts will not interfere in
religious societies with reference to their ecclesiastical practices
stems from the separation of the church and state, but has
always been qualified by the rule that civil and property rights
would be adjudicated. (See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall.
(U.S.) 679 [20 L.Ed. 666] ; Church of Christ of Long Beach
v. Harper, 83 Cal.App. 41 [256 P. 476]; Dyer v. Superior
Court, 94 Cal.App. 260 [271 P. 113].) There are two ways
in which the problem may arise. The question may arise as
to the extent to which the court is bound by the decisions of
the church tribunals in either ecclesiastical or temporal matters, or the scope of the jurisdiction the court will exercise
when there are no such tribunals but there are disputes between factions concerning ecclesiastical and temporal matters. In the instant case the court found that there was no
established church system or government therefor and hence
no church tribunals. Whether an activity is ecclesiastical or
involves property rights, especially when a decision on one
necessarily involves consideration of the other, are difficult
questions. Ecclesiastical matters include in the main, creeds
and proper modes of exercising one's belief. While the principle that courts will not purport to exercise eccelesiastical
jurisdiction is settled as an abstract p_roposition, they will
determine civil and property rights which depend essentially
on the contracts of the parties as evinced by rules, regulations,
practices and customs accepted and followed. The matter
has been generally summarized: "It is obvious that no case
can reach the civil courts unless it involves some property
or other civil right. The courts of the land are not concerned with mere polemic discussions, and cannot coerce the
performance of obligations of a spiritual character, or adopt
a judicial standard for theological orthodoxy, or determine
the abstract truth of religious doctrines, or adjudicate whether
a certain person is a Catholic in good standing, or settle mere
questions of faith or doctrine, or make changes in the liturgy,
or dictate the policy of a church in the seating of the sexes,
or the playing of instrumental music, or decide who the rightful leader of a church ought to be, or enjoin a clergyman from
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striking the complainant's name from his register of communicants, or enforce the religious right of a member to partake
of the Lord's Supper."· (American Church Law, Zollman,
§ 313.) It is also settled principle that: "It is perfectly
clear that, whatever church relationship is maintained in the
United States, is not a matter of status. It is based, not on
residence, or birth, or compulsion, but on voluntary consent.
It rests on faith, 'primarily, faith in. God and his teachings;
secondarily, faith in and reliance upon each other.' It is
'one of contract,' and is therefore exactly what the parties
to it make it and nothing more. A person who joins a church
covenants expressly or impliedly that in consideration of the
benefits which result :from such a union he will submit to its
control and be governed by its laws, usages and customs
whether they are of an ecclesiastical or temporal character
to which laws, usages, and customs he assents as to so many ·
stipulations of a contract. The formal evidence of such contract is contained in the canons of the church, the constitution,
articles, and by-laws of the ~ociety, and the customs and
usages which have grown up in connection with these instruments." (American Church Law, Zollman, § 328.)
There appears to be no question between the parties here
as to the proper way or method of teaching the philosophy
or its principles. Rather, the dispute concerns who shall have
the right to use the property, to teach the philosophy, and
exercise the other rights herein enumerated. Closely related
to the right to use the property are also involved the rights
of solicitation of, and contributions :from members, and of
selling the writings. In fact, plaintiff corporation by its complaint demands a settlement of these matters for it prays
that it should be a~corded the right to solicit membership and
contributions, to use the writings, have the mailing lists and
be fr!!e :from interference in conducting its meetings, services
and lectures. Moreover, the dispute between the parties has
been going on for many years and should be settled.
In connection with the jurisdictional question, plaintiff cor.p oration argues further, that religious organizations are dual
jn nature, one part consisting of the members as a spiritual
body, and the other as an unincorporated entity constituting
the secular body; and that the plaintiff corporation here is
the secular body. It is argued that this was determined by the
decree in Weaver v. Meyncke, and reference is made to statements that a chu:rch society does not lose its identity by incorporatll;lg ;. that the corporation and the church, although
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one, may exist within the pole of the other, are not correlative,
but each is independent of the other, one dealing with spiritual
things and the other temporal. (See 45 Am.Jur., Religious
Societies, § 8; Wheelock v. First Presb. Church, 119 Cal. 477
[51 P. 841] .) [2] The essential problem, nevertheless, is to ascertain from the acts, dealings and usages of the parties where
the various rights rest in order to determine the ownership of
civil and property rights, even though some so-called ecclesiastical rights are involved. Plaintiff corporation was found
to own the property at Mt. Ecclesia but as a trustee for the unincorporated church, its members, and defendant corporation
and its members. Organized, or unorganized, or lacking in
an established church government, the followers of Mr. and
Mrs. Heindel, and later of Mrs. Heindel, were as a group,
the beneficiaries, and as such have always possessed the other
rights accorded them in the judgment. As shown by the
discussion earlier in this opinion some of the so-called ecclesiastical functions are so interwoven with civil and property
· rights that any decision involving the latter must necessarily
affect the former. Moreover, it was recognized in the recitations in the 1931 contract with Mrs. Heindel, that both
plaintiff corporation and the followers as a group had some
rights somewhat in the nature of both ecclesiastical and property.
Plaintiff urges that generally courts have classi,fied religious organizations into three categories: (1) Where one or
a few persons, usually claiming divine right, control the whole
hierarchy, including the local churches or societies; (2) Where
there is a similar hierarchy but an assembly is in control ; and
(3) Where each local group is in charge of all its affairs
through majority vote of its members and there is no control
from above. (See Watson v. Jones, supra; 45 Am.Jur., Religious Societies, § 4.) It is also urged that where there is a
schism or split between the followers or members of a society
in the third class, or in an anomalous class which fits in none
of the three, like the Rosicrucians, those adhering to the original structure, whether or not they constitute a majority of all
the members, are declared to have all of the property rights.
It is argued that plaintiff corporation is the original structure and, therefore, it must have the property rights rather
than the unorganized church or followers who later formed
defendant corporation.
The basic question in a controversy such as this should be
the ownership of civil and property rights as shown by the
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conduct and acts of the parties. A classification based on a
formula is not of much assistance, especially when we have,
as we do here, an anomalous arrangement. (See American
Church Law, Zollman, § 328, supra.) Nor is it important
whether a schism in the technical sense has occurred so far
as the creed or philosophy is concerned, and the :findings and
judgment on a whole show that there has been none. It appears that from the first, the unorganized church and its
members through its leaders, the Heindels, have exercised
property and civil rights incident to ecclesiastical functions
which were not surrendered to plaintiff corporation. As
heretofore stated the court found that centers, or groups of
followers, were formed by Mr. Heindel in 1909, before plaintiff corporation was formed. It was also found that after
the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Heindel, they taught, wrote,
sold writings, and solicited members; that from 1910 to 1913
their followers constituted an unincorporated church association known as "The Rosicrucian Fellowship"; that the Mt.
Ecclesia property was purchased and improved in part by
contributions from those followers and the property was declared by Heindel to be held in trust for the followers ; that
plaintiff corporation was formed in 1913 to hold Mt. Ecclesia
for the benefit of the followers, but without their consent;
that from 1913 to 1919, the Heindels, with the assistance of
the followers as members of the church, 11 conducted all ecclesiastical functions for the church'' and continued to do so
until1944. Those functions included obtaining contr-ibutions,
using Mt. Ecclesia, lecturing, teaching, the preparation, dissemination and sale of writings which had, as above seen,
property and civil right aspects; that Mt. Ecclesia was deeded
to plaintiff corporation in trust for the benefit of the followers
but title to the writings was retained by Mrs. Heindel; that
plaintiff corporation conducted certain business affairs all for
the benefit of the unincorporated church, and that it also
performed some so-called ecclesiastical functions without the
consent of the followers who did not waive their right to organize themselves into a permanent church organization but
did organize defendant corporation with a complete church
government. In short, the true organization was the unincorporated church association, its members and the members of
defendant corporation which was incorporated in 1944. It
was, and is, the true and original structure, in ecclesiastical
and secular activities, and any functions exercised by plaintiff
corporation, except the management of the Mt. Ecclesia prop-
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erty and the license from Mrs. Heindel to use the writings,
were usurped by plaintiff corporation. The court found that
a majority of the followers formed defendant corporation
and while that was a factor considered by the court in reaching its conclusion as to the ownership of the rights, it was also
predicated on the premise that the unincorporated church
was the basic group and owned most of the rights. The judgment preserved to plaintiff corporation the limited rights as
trustee of Mt. Ecclesia and the license to use the writings.
From the foregoing it is clear that the court did not adopt any
different system than had existed for the ownership and exercise of the rights involved as claimed by plaintiff corporation.
It determined the basic rights of the parties as shown by custom, usage, and past practices of the parties themselves.
Plaintiff asserts that no notice was given to the followers
of the formation of defendant corporation; that a majority did
not agree thereto ; and that the court erred in considering the
number who had joined at the time of trial rather than the
number at the time the action was commenced. The court
found that by April, 1945, 541 probationers and disciples out
of 706 in the United States had become members of defendant corporation, which is, of course, a majority. [3] Inasmuch as this action is in the nature of an equitable proceeding, the court may consider the facts as they existed at the
time of trial so that the interests of justice may be subserved.
(Mercer Casualty Co . v. Lewis, 41 Cal.App.2d 918 [108 P.2d
65].) Defendant corporation has offered to prove here that
most of the foreign followers have also applied for membership.
We think that is unnecessary as we feel the court was justified in assuming that a sufficiently substantial number of those
who could reasonably be reached had joined. Moreover, we
understand the judgment to accord the rights to all members
of the. unincorporated church association, as well as defendant corporation, and hence the foreign followers have not been
prejudiced.
Plaintiff asserts there cannot be two corporations, plaintiff
and defendant, with one controlling temporal affairs and
the other, a religious corporation, controlling ecclesiastical
matters. It is contended that a corporation cannot be formed
for ecclesiastical purposes, that it may exercise only temporal
powers. (Wheelock v. First Presb. Church, 119 Cal. 477 [51
P. 841].) In that case, the court speaks of the formation of
nonprofit corporations for religious purposes, which could be
formed for any lawful purpose Uilder former section 593 of
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the Civil Code, which authorized the formation of corporations for secular purposes only. Defendants urge that corporations may be formed to carry on religious, as well as temporal functions, under the law existing when defendant corporation was formed. That law, now Corporations Code, section 9200, provides that nonprofit corporations may be formed
for any lawful purpose for which persons may associate
themselves, such as religious purposes. [4] However, it is
not material here, because, as we have seen, the rights which
we interpret the judgment to affect, are essentially property
in nature and we see no reason why some of them may not
be in plaintiff and others in defendant corporations in accordance with the conduct and usage of the parties. The judgment states that all of Mt. Ecclesia, and the personal property thereon, is held by plaintiff corporation for the use and
benefit of cross-complainants as probationers and disciples of
the philosophy, ''as members of the unincorporated church
association organized in 1908 and 1909" and as members of
''defendant corporation, as beneficiaries.'' Thus, all followers,
whether members of the unincorporated church, or the defend.ant corporation, are beneficiaries and may use the property.
We do not construe it to mean that only the members of defendant corporation are beneficiaries entitled to use the propPrty. Hence it is of no particular consequence whether defendant corporation was formed for a valid purpose, or that
mPmhPrs of nefendant corporation are also mentioned as bem~
ficiariPs hl'cause members and followers of the philosophy are
thP truE' beneficiaries.
Plfdntiff corporation claims that the church R.Ssociation
ann ih; members turned over the functions of conducting
thE' r.hurch to it ann that they are now !'Stopped to claim those
fnnr.tions or that the association is unincorporated. It rf'ff'rs
to thE' finding that at all times after 1913 (the date of its
formation) the church association and its mem berR were uninrorporated but it was also founn that it, plaintiff corporation, conducted temporal and se.c ular functions for the members of the church association and has the right, subject to the
dominant right of the association, to use the property for temporal purposes; that tbf' church association was formed and
reg-ulations adopt!'d by it without the consent of plaintiff corporation. Plaintiff corporation appears to assert that it has
the right to exercise ecclesiastical functions, a matter which
in other places it claims a corporation cannot have. The findings show that from 1913 to 1924 plaintiff corporation con-
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ducted ''certain'' secular functions and the judgment accorded
it that power. It was also found that the followers did not
consent to the formation of plaintiff corporation or its regulations. In this connection plaintiff asserts that the judgment
in Weaver v. Meyncke is contrary to the present holding. We
find nothing inconsistent in the holding of these cases. In
the Weaver case the main question was whether the trustees
of plaintiff had misappropriated trust funds. It was there
found that plaintiff corporation was a corporation and its
articles were legally amended; that none of the members of
the unincorporated church were members of the corporation
or entitled to vote for the trustees thereof; that such members
had not been deprived of any right in the corporation. It was
also found, however, that the members of the church were
cestuis of the corporation trustee and were entitled to apply
to the court for relief from any corporate mismanagement;
that the property was held by the corporation as trustee for
the members, all in harmony with the judgment here. So far
as the legality of the formation of the corporation and amendments of its articles is concerned, the law may have been complied with without constituting a surrender by the church
association and its members of all their rights to the property.
Reasonably interpreted, the Weaver findings and ' judgment
do no more than generally recognize plaintiff corporation as
owner of Mt. Ecclesia as trustee for the unincorporated church
association. It does not' purport to deal with the right to use
the property or the details of the ecclesiastical rights which
have property right aspects (as heretofore mentioned) which
have been exercised by the unincorporated association.
[5] The essence of plaintiff's contention in this respect
seems to be that since the unincorporated church association
had surrendered all its rights and powers to it, and that as it,
plaintiff, had exercised those rights over a period of time with
the acquiescence of the association, the latter is now estopped
to assert them. As heretofore seen, the court found that there
was no waiver by, or estoppel. on the part of, the church
association or its members, and that they owned the rights subject to certain rights in plaintiff; that there was an organized
system or church government, and that the members did not
consent to the incorporation of plaintiff or amendments to its
articles of incorporation. We cannot say there has been a surrender of all rights to plaintiff, or a recognition that plaintiff.
had all of those rights, as was the case in Baker v. Ducker,

138

RosiCRUCIAN FELLow.

v. RosiCRUOIAN ETa. CH. (39 C.2d

79 Cal. 365 [21 P. 764], Bear v. HeasZey, 98 Mich. 279 (57
N.W. 270, 24 L.R.A. 615] and other cases cited by plaintiff.
[6] Plaintiff asserts that the evidence shows it was to have
all of the rights above mentioned. Specifically, it is asserted
that Heindel told the followers in 1912 that he intended to
form the corporation, that articles were filed in 1913 in which
the Heindels were two of the five incorporators, and the followers were told of the incorporation; that Seattle center
followers turned their assets over to the corporation and took
their instructions in the philosophy from plaintiff; that plaintiff corporation adopted and enforced rules dealing with the
operation of the philosophy; that it has enrolled a substantial
number of followers; and that Mrs. Heindel organized a
church, Max Heindel Rose-Cross Philosophies, which was dissolved by the 1934 agreement. On the other hand, there is
evidence that instructions in the dissemination of the philosophy were not taken from plaintiff; that plaintiff was first
organized as a college or seminary corporation and it was
to be only the trustee of the property; that Heindel did not
transfer the property to plaintiff; that the property was not
transferred until after his death; that the Heindels and followers were carrying on so-called ecclesiastical functions and
using the property to disseminate their writings ; that Mr. and
Mrs. Heindel were the leaders in the church association (later,
Mrs. Heindel was the leader) ; that the unorganized church
association used the name ''The Rosicrucian Fellowship'' and
was the church rather than plaintiff; that title to the writings
has always remained with Mrs. Heindel; that only physical,
or purely business, functions were carried on by plaintiff; that
plaintiff has no members except the trustees who were selfperpetuating. It was for the trial court to weigh the evidence
and draw any reasonable inferences deducible therefrom.
Hence the authorities (Linke v. Church of Jesus Christ, 71
Cal.App.2d 667 (163 P.2d 44], and others) cited by plaintiff
to the effect that one who joins a church submits to its constitution and by-laws, are not in point. We think it is clear
from the record that the church was the unincorporated association of followers as found by the court.
Near the end of the trial, without objection and by leave
of court, defendants amended their cross-complaint by adding
an allegation to the effect that the action was prosecuted for
the benefit of all those persons in the United State who are
believers in the philosophy as taught by the Heindels, and
stated that there were approximately 706 such persons ; that
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it would be impracticable to name them all as parties. In
other words, the cross-complaint wa.S amended to show that
the action was a representative one. Plaintiff claims that it
was not a proper case for a representative action in that it
did not purport to include followers outside the United States ;
that it was not brought in good faith, because counsel for crosscomplainants stated in court that the representation was only
of defendant corporation members; that the defendant corporation cannot be a representative inasmuch as its interests are
adverse to those purported to be represented. It further claims
that because the action was not a representative one, all the
believers were indispensable parties.
[7] We believe the cross-complaint pleads sufficient facts
to make this a proper representative suit. There was no bad
faith shown on the part of the cross-complainants. The discussion with reference to the amendment ef the cross-complaint
was general and, at the trial before the amendment, the action
was treated as a representative one to which plaintiff made no
objection. The cross-complainants, other than defendant and
cross-complainant corporation, are followers of the philosophy.
The basic issue involved was as to the dominant use of the
property and, as we have seen, the judgment, if properly
interpreted, preserved that use to all the followers, whether
members of the unincorporated church association or defendant corporation. Followers, other than members of defendant
corporation, are not excluded nor are members in foreign
lands deprived of any rights. Whether the foreign members
are bound by the judgment need not be determined. It follows
that there is no adverse interest because the judgment protects
R.ll followers, and we see no reason why the followers who are
cross-complainants could not, in p_art at least, choose a corporation they had formed, the defendant corporation, to lead
in t')le representative suit. Generally speaking, in controversies such as this it is considered that: " ... [P]laintiffs [members of a church suing in behalf of all] bring the
action for the benefit of all the members of the . . . Church.
In effect, each member is a party plaintiff, and that all the
members could jointly bring the action we feel well assured.
It is said in Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. (U.S.) 288 [14 L.
Ed. 942] : 'The rule is well established that where the parties
interested are numerous, and the suit is for an object common
to them all, some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf
of themselvel:! a.nd :the others; and a bill may also be main-
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tained against a portion of a numerous body of defendants representing a common interest.' Baker v. Ducker, 79 Cal. 365
[21 P. 764], is to the same effect." (Wheelock v. First Presb.
Church, 119 Cal. 477, 481 [51 P. 841] .) It is apparent that
if this is a proper representative action all the persons represented are not indispensable parties. If plaintiff's argument
is to prevail, it is· doubtful that the controversies here could
ever be settled unless every follower here, and abroad, was
made a party. Obviously, this would not be feasible.
Plaintiff makes several contentions with reference to the
court's determination that the 1934 agreement was breached
and cancelled and that the 1931 contract was in force and
effect. The court found, as above noted, that the sole consideration for Mrs. Heindel's agreement in the 1934 contract to
give plaintiff an exclusive license to use the writings, was
plaintiff corporation:s promise that she would hold the positions with the corporation heretofore mentioned for as long
as she desired; the court found plaintiff breached the contract
in 1942-194;4 by removing her from the positions in failing to
reelect her.
Plaintiff argues that the contract does not require that
she hold positions so long as she desires as found by the court.
[8] We feel that the trial court's construction of the contract is reasonable when all the circumstances are taken into
consideration. It will be r.ecalled that the agreement recited
that the 1931 contract had dealt with the right to the
writings, that Mrs. Heindel could grant to an organization
sponsored by her, a license to use the writings; that she had
formed a thriving organization; that plaintiff corporation,
which advocated the philosophy, had prospered and had
funds ; that the two organizations should unite for more
effective operation under the name Rosicrucian Philosophy;
that the organization formed by Mrs. Heindel should be
dissolved and the writings held by it.turned over to plaintiff.
It was agreed that a repetition of a two-organization situation
was injurious and was to be avoided; Mrs. Heindel's years
of work were recognized. All of those factors indicated an
intP.nt to compromise. These factors showed that although
plaintiff was to have the right to use the writings and Mrs.
Heindel could not give that right to another organization,
Mrs. Heindel was not to lose complete control of the writings
or the situatiQn. · It ·Was then provided that Mrs. Heindel
should be elected trustee .and to fill vacancies to be created
in other positions, including chairman of the executive com-
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mittee, composed of five, and to be "manager in charge"
of the fellowship activities; she was to write, supervise the
preparation of writings and was to be editor of the magazine;
and finally, because Mrs. Heindel spent years working in the
philosophy, she was to have assur!lD.ce that ''if at any time
she ceases to be active in connection with the work and retires
from authority," she was to become "President Emeritus."
It is inferable therefrom that she was not to become president
emeritus until she voluntarily retired from authority. This
indicated that until she did so retire she was to hold the
positions named and retain the authority. If it were otherwise
the other trustees could, at their will, make the agreement
meaningless by removing her from the positions, thus leaving
her a mere empty right. That she was to hold them as long
as she desired is further evidenced by the fact that the trustees
acquiesced in the occupancy of the positions by Mrs. Heindel
from 1934 until 1942.
Reference is made to the judgment in Weaver v. Meyncke,
where it was said that Mrs. Heindel's removal from the positions held by her was "legal." That issue was not involved
in that case, and although the procedure may have been
"legal" there was nothing to indicate what the consequences
of the breach of the 1934 contract would be.
It should also be observed that plaintiff claims the contract cannot be properly litigated here because Mrs. Heindel, not defendant corporation, was a party to the contract
but that she is not a party here except as a representative
of the followers, by amendment to the cross-complaint. We
have concluded that she is a party to this action. She was
named individually as defendant by plaintiff, and as crosscomplainant in the cross-complaint, and we do not believe
the amendment excluded her as an individual. She has taken
an active part in the litigation and will, unquestionably, be
bound by the judgment.
For the reasons above discussed the court was justified
in finding a breach and cancellation of the 1934 contract.
Implicit in the finding is the conclusion that the breach and
failure of consideration was of a substantial character although the part of the contract which was breached was not
the sole consideration therefor as Mrs. Heindel was to receive,
in addition, sustenance at Mt. Ecclesia.
Plaintiff urges that there was no allegation of an offer,
or any offer, to restore the consideration received by Mrs.
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Heindel under the 1934 agreement and that such an offer
was necessary. Most of the matters in the other counts were
reiterated in the four th count of the cross-complaint, and the
1931 and 1934 contracts are pleaded in haec verba. It was also
pleaded that the 1934 contract modified the 1931 contract with
respect to Mrs. H eindel's right to grant a license to use the
writings and that the sole consideration therefor was that Mrs.
Heindel was to have living quarters at Mt. Ecclesia and hold
the positions as long as she desire!l; that in 1942-1944 plaintiff
caused Mrs. Heindel to be removed from the positions in
violation of the contract; that on October 7, 1944, Mrs. Heindel
gave notice to plaintiff of the termination of the contract;
that a controversy exists between the parties as to whether
the contract is still in effect.
We must look at both contracts to see what Mrs. Heindel
was entitled to receive and what she did receive under the
1934 contract. Provision was made in the 1931 contract,
which was continued in force except as modified by the 1934
contract, for an annuity. The annuity provisions were the
same in both contracts so she would not be required to restore
any money received thereunder. The plaintiff and Mrs. Heindel have the right to use, and Mrs. Heindel is the owner of,
the writings under both contracts. Plaintiff could not, but
Mrs. Heindel could, grant to an organization sponsored by her,
a license to use the writings. In the 1934 contract she gave
up that right. Under the latter contract she sold certain
assets at their market value; that part of the contract was
performed. The additional things which Mrs. Heindel WSB to
receive under the 1934 contract, and which would be the only
ones considered so far as restoration is concerned were that
she was to have living quarters at Mt. Ecclesia and to be
allowed "sustenance" at the cafeteria there. She testified
that she used the $3,200 she received from the transferred
assets for furniture, supplies, and the houses in which she
lived, and that she received "no compensation" and no "consideration'' for giving up her right to license the use of the
writings to another. [9] Plaintiff claims that was a conclusion drawn by Mrs. Heindel and that it was not evidence,
citing Huntsman v. State Harbor Commrs., 17 Cal.App.2d
749 [62 P.2d 771], but no objection was made to the answer
and it may be considered as showing that she did not receive
consideration. In the Huntsman case the question was whether
there was a valid contract insofar as consideration therefor
w~s concerned. The contract there provided for consideration
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on its face. The question here is whether the promised
consideration was received as it relates to the necessity for
restoration. In addition, Mrs. Heindel prepared writings and
lessons for the corporation, performed services for it and
refrained from licensing the writings to others, all of which
may be considered to have been of some value. Under all the
circumsta-nces we believe there was nothing of consequence
required to be restored.
In this connection plaintiff argues that the pleading
was insufficient because it did not allege that restoration
was not necessary. Liberally construed, the cross-complaint
was sufficient to advise plaintiff of the issues to be met.
Moreover, it should be observed that plaintiff elicited from
Mrs. Heindel the answer that she had received no consideration during its examination of her under section 2055 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Wbile it was not bound by that
testimony it was brought out as a material issue.
In the same connection, plaintiff claims the court committed reversible error in sustaining an objection to a
question asked Dodson, plaintiff's treasurer, as to whether
Mrs. Heindel had offered to restore, or had restored, anything
she received under the contract. Our conclusion that Mrs.
Heindel had received nothing worthy of restoration answers
this argument of plaintiff.
Plaintiff claims that the injunctive provisions of the judgment are improper. It asserts that there is no pleading or
proof to justify them, that they are uncertain, that some of
them consist of restraining libelous and slanderous statements
which are not cognizable in equity since such restraint would
constitute an unwarranted interference with freedom of speech.
The cross-complaint appears to plead primarily a cause
of action for declaratory relief but plaintiff does not assert
that a declaratory judgment may not also give injunctive
relief in an equity case. The cross-complaint prays for a
declaration of rights and such other relief as may be proper.
The injunctive part of the judgment restrained plaintiff from
(1) asserting ownership of the property except as trustee for
the beneficiaries; (2) interfering with their use of the property
in the conduct of ecclesiastical functions ; ( 3) conducting or
interfering with the conduct of ecclesiastical functions; (4)
claiming the exclusive right to use the name "Rosicrucia1;1
Fellowship''; or interfering with its use by cross-complainants;
(5) interfering with the use by the followers of the lists and
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stencils, etc., of names and addresses of followers; ( 6) claiming defendant has no right under the license from Mrs. Heindel
to print and distribute the writings; (7). interfering with the
use by Mrs. Heindel, or defendant corporation of the plates
for printing the writings; ( 8) making either oral or written
statements that Mrs. Heindel was untruthful, had selfish purposes in organizing defendant corporation, or that defehdant
corporation was an outlaw organization, or otherwise doing
acts to deter followers from becoming members of defendant
corporation; (9) interfering with the exclusive use by Mrs.
Heindel, or followers designated by defendant church, of confidential discipleship instructions prepared by her. The court
found that since 1943 plaintiff corporation had taken various
steps to prevent the followers from organizing themselves
into a church organization. Those steps consisted of claiming
power to expel, and expelling followers, making statements
in derogation of Mrs. Heindel, and casting aspersions on
defendant corporation so ·as to deter followers from becoming
members, and assure continued adherence to plaintiff. It
was also found that plaintiff corporation has excluded members who participated in the organization of defen.dant corporation from the use of the property ; that plaintiff corporation took possession of philosophy instructions written by Mrs.
Heindel; that plaintiff threatens to, and will unless enjoined,
continue to do those things; that plaintiff claims the right to
expel followers, and exclude them from the use of the property
for ecclesiastical and other purposes ; that plaintiff has prevented the use of the list of names, addresses, and stencils.
That plaintiff is continuing these claims appears from the
prayer of its complaint where it asks that defendants be
restrained from using the name 11 The Rosicrucian Fellowship''
or anything like it ; from soliciting followers for contributions ;
and from using any of the writings.
[10] It is true that an injunction "is ordered against past
acts only if there is evidence that they will probably recur."
(Hannah v. Pogue, 23 Cal.2d 849, 858 [147 P .2d 572].) We
believe, however, the record sufficiently indicates that the acts
will probably recur. It is 110t unreasonable to suppose that
assertions of claims to the property will be injurious to
cross-complainants.
. [11] There is no merit to the claim of uncertainty in that
part of the injunction which restrains interference with the
dominant use of the property for ecclesiastical purposes by
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the followers. "Dominant use" clearly means the superior
right and the judgment in other parts heretofore · quoted
defines such rig-hts.
Complaint is made that the eighth provision of the injunction, heretofore mentioned (paragraph C [9] of the judgment),
violates the right of freedom of speech and is like an injunction restraining slanderous or libelous statements. [12] It
is established that an injunction will not be granted where
the restraint interferes with freedom of speech. (See Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 [51 S.Ct. 625, 75
L.Ed. 1357] ; Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94 (44 P. 458,
53 Am.St.Rep. 160, 32 L.R.A. 273]; Magill Bros., Inc. v. Building Service etc. Union, 20 Cal.2d 506 [127 P.2d 542] ; In re
Wood, 194 Cal. 49 [227 P . 908] ; Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf
Club, 30 Cal.2d 110, 117 [180 P.2d 321, 171 A.L.R. 913].)
While it has been said that an injunction may be granted
to restrain the making of false or libelous statements where
there is a breach of trust or contract, to injure business relations (se>e Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th ed., § 1358;
28 Am.Jur., Injunctions, §§ 118, 119) and although there
are property and contract aspects in this case, the provision
here is too broad and does impinge upon freedom of speech
especially when we consider that religious controversies are
also concerned. Hence paragraph 0(9) of the judgment must
be, and is, stricken.
[13] Plaintiff urges that it should have been granted injunctive relief. The judgment declares plaintiff's rights and,
as such relief is to some extent discretionary with the court,
(14 Cal.Jur. 185-186) we do not think a reversal is justified.
[14] Plaintiff claims error in the refusal of its offer of
proof by a witness, Mrs. Murray. She had testified on direct
examination that a list of members exhibited to her showed
the number of followers who were members of defendant
corporation. On cross-examination plaintiff offered to prove
by her that the list was not a true one in that it contained names
of persons who were not members of the fellowship or of
defendant corporation. We do not think prejudicial error
was committed when we consider that the trial court may have
felt that it was unlikely the witness would change her testimony on direct examination and, as we construe the judgment,
the rights are accorded to all followers of the philosophy
wheth.er or not they are members of defendant corporation.
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The judgment is modified by striking out paragraph 0(9)
thereof, and as so modified, is affirmed. Respondents to
recover costs on appeal.
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied July 17,
1952.
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[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Rebuttal Evidence.-Where defendant in a narcotics case testified that he "wouldn't knmv narcotics" and had had no contact with them, testimony of a
woman acquaintance indicating that he had sam~ knowledge
of cocaine is admissible and does not tend to show ·the commission of another offense.
[2] Witnesses-Impeachment-Impeaching One's Own Witness.A party may impeach his own witness by the use of prior
inconsistent statements where he has been surprised and
damaged by the witness' testimony. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 2049, 2052.)
[3] !d.-Impeachment-Impeaching One's Own Witness.-Where
woman, placed on witness stand by prosecution for purpose
of rebutting defendant's testimony that he did not tell her
that he used cocaine, denied that he ever told her that he used
such drug, and such denial was likely to make it appear to
the jury that the district attorney was harassing defendant by
asking him whether he had made such a statement to the
woman, the prosecution is entitled to correct this damaging
impression by cross-examining its own witness and by impeaching her with proof of her prior inconsistent statements.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 304; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 277.
[2] Right of party surprised by unfavorable testimony of own
witness to ask him concerning previous inconsistent statements,
note, 74 A.L.R. 1042. See, also, Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 146; Am.
Jur., Witnesses, § 798.
McK. Dig. References : [1] Criminal Law, § 287; [2, 3] Witnesses, § 275 (4).

